本地信息、错配与监管执法中随机化的成本

Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Yile Xiao", "affiliation": ["State Key Laboratory of Pollution Control and Resource Reuse", "Nanjing University"]}, {"name": "Mengdi Liu", "affiliation": ["University of International Business and Economics", "State Key Laboratory of Pollution Control and Resource Reuse", "Nanjing University"]}, {"name": "Miaomiao Liu", "affiliation": ["University of International Business and Economics", "State Key Laboratory of Pollution Control and Resource Reuse", "Nanjing University"]}, {"name": "Bing Zhang", "affiliation": ["Nanjing University of Finance and Economics", "National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation"]}]

中文摘要

为遏制合谋并提升程序完整性，随机检查已被引入。在中国，随机环境检查与保留地方自由裁量权的常规检查并行，这为评估二者在发现违规行为方面的因果差异提供了一个准实验环境。利用超过16万条检查记录，我们发现，相对于常规检查，随机检查降低了发现违规行为的监管有效性，识别出的环境问题减少32%，违规行为减少88%。这源于随机检查对高风险企业的瞄准较弱，以及检查人员专业知识与企业具体情境之间的不匹配，这种不匹配也限制了对未来违规行为的威慑作用。这些发现凸显了监管设计中约束自由裁量权与保留地方专业知识之间的权衡。

Abstract

Randomized inspections have been introduced to curb collusion and enhance procedural integrity. In China, randomized environmental inspections run alongside routine inspections that preserve local discretion, creating a quasi-experimental setting to assess their causal difference in detecting violations. Using over 160,000 inspection records, we find randomized inspections reduce regulatory effectiveness in detecting violations relative to routine inspections, identifying 32% fewer environmental problems and 88% fewer violations. This stems from weaker targeting of high-risk firms and a mismatch between inspector expertise and firm-specific contexts, which also limits deterrence of future violations. These findings highlight the trade-off between constraining discretion and preserving local expertise in regulatory design.