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随机经济中的无限债务展期

Infinite Debt Rollover in Stochastic Economies
Econometrica · 2023 · Narayana Kocherlakota

中文摘要

本文表明,当利率/增长率具有随机性时,借款人进行可持续的无限债务展期(即“庞氏骗局”)的空间更大。在此背景下,我证明相关的“r 与 g”比较所采用的 r,是无限期限零息债券的长期收益率 r_long。我表明,当短期收益率可变时,r_long 低于短期收益率的风险中性预期;当短期收益率具有高度持续性时,r_long 接近短期收益率的最小可能实现值。本文将这些结果应用于说明性的异质性主体动态随机一般均衡模型,得出了关于公共债务泡沫存在性的类似弱化的充分条件。

Abstract

This paper shows that there is more scope for a borrower to engage in a sustainable infinite debt rollover (a “Ponzi scheme”) when interest/growth rates are stochastic. In this context, I prove that the relevant “r vs. g” comparison uses the yield r long to an infinite‐maturity zero‐coupon bond. I show that r long is lower than the risk‐neutral expectation of the short‐term yield when it is variable, and that r long is close to the minimal realization of the short‐term yield when it is highly persistent. The paper applies these results to illustrative heterogeneous agent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to obtain similarly weakened sufficient conditions for the existence of public debt bubbles.
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