Subsidizing Labour Hoarding in Recessions: The Employment and Welfare Effects of Short-time Work
中文摘要
短时工作制（STW）政策向遭受暂时性冲击的企业中的劳动者提供工时缩减补贴。该政策是经济下行期支持企业囤积劳动力的主要政策工具，并在2019冠状病毒病（COVID-19）大流行期间得到大规模运用。然而，人们对其就业和福利后果仍知之甚少。本文利用意大利独有的社会保障行政数据以及短时工作制政策规则中的准实验变异，提供了有关大衰退期间短时工作制对企业和劳动者结果影响的证据。我们的结果表明，短时工作制处理对工时具有幅度较大且显著的负向影响，但对就业人数具有幅度较大且显著的正向影响。随后，我们区分暂时性冲击与持续性更强的冲击，分析这些正向就业效应是否能够增进福利。我们首先提供证据表明，如果没有短时工作制，流动性约束以及工资和工时刚性可能导致劳动力囤积低于有效水平。接着，我们表明，低生产率企业逆向选择进入短时工作制，降低了该计划的长期保险价值；当冲击具有持续性时，还会产生显著的负向再配置效应。
Abstract
Abstract Short-time work (STW) policies provide subsidies for hour reductions to workers in firms experiencing temporary shocks. They are the main policy tool used to support labour hoarding during downturns and were aggressively used during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Yet, very little is known about their employment and welfare consequences. This article leverages unique administrative social security data from Italy and quasi-experimental variation in STW policy rules to offer evidence on the effects of STW on firms’ and workers’ outcomes during the Great Recession. Our results show large and significant negative effects of STW treatment on hours, but large and positive effects on headcount employment. We then analyse whether these positive employment effects are welfare enhancing, distinguishing between temporary and more persistent shocks. We first provide evidence that liquidity constraints and rigidities in wages and hours may make labour hoarding inefficiently low without STW. Then, we show that adverse selection of low productivity firms into STW reduces the long-run insurance value of the program and creates significant negative reallocation effects when the shock is persistent.