中文摘要
围绕薪酬透明度的讨论一直聚焦于局部均衡效应：劳动者如何通过知情重新谈判来纠正薪酬不公。我们考察雇主在均衡中如何作出反应。我们研究一个双方不完全信息下的讨价还价模型。我们的模型预测，透明度会降低劳动者的个体议价能力，从而导致平均工资下降。一个关键洞见是，雇主可信地拒绝向任何单个劳动者支付高工资，以避免与其他劳动者发生代价高昂的重新谈判。当劳动者的个体议价能力较低时，薪酬透明度的影响较为微弱。我们运用对美国州级法律的事件研究分析来检验我们的模型，这些法律保护私营部门劳动者与同事交流薪资信息的权利。与我们的理论预测相一致，透明度法律在实证上导致工资下降约2%，且当劳动者的个体议价能力较低时，工资下降的幅度最小。
Abstract
The discourse around pay transparency has focused on partial equilibrium effects: how workers rectify pay inequities through informed renegotiation. We investigate how employers respond in equilibrium. We study a model of bargaining under two‐sided incomplete information. Our model predicts that transparency reduces the individual bargaining power of workers, leading to lower average wages. A key insight is that employers credibly refuse to pay high wages to any one worker to avoid costly renegotiations with others. When workers have low individual bargaining power, pay transparency has a muted effect. We test our model with an event‐study analysis of U.S. state‐level laws protecting the right of private sector workers to communicate salary information with their coworkers. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, transparency laws empirically lead wages to decline by approximately 2%, and wage declines are smallest in magnitude when workers have low individual bargaining power.