中文摘要
各国政府不遗余力地吸引外国跨国公司，因为人们认为这类公司能够提高其雇员的工资（直接效应），并改善当地本土企业的经营结果（间接效应）。我们利用税务记录中的外资所有权信息，构建了首个包含外资所有权信息的美国雇主—雇员数据集，以衡量这些直接效应和间接效应。我们发现，外国跨国公司对其美国工人的平均直接效应是使工资提高7%。这一工资溢价对技能水平较高的工人以及来自高人均GDP国家的企业雇员而言更大。我们发现有证据表明，产生外资企业溢价的是跨国生产网络成员身份，而非外资属性本身。我们利用外资企业以往按所有权所属国形成的空间集聚特征来识别间接效应。通勤区就业中外国跨国公司份额的扩大，显著增加了当地本土所有企业的就业和增加值，并提高了高收入工人的工资。我们的估计表明，外国跨国公司每创造一个就业岗位，当地原有工人的工资总额每年增加13,400美元，其中三分之二来自间接效应。我们的估计表明，外国跨国公司能够通过与地方政府达成巨额补贴协议（mega-deals），攫取其所创造的当地剩余中相当大的一部分。
Abstract
Abstract Governments go to great lengths to attract foreign multinationals because they are thought to raise the wages paid to their employees (direct effects) and to improve outcomes at local domestic firms (indirect effects). We construct the first U.S. employer-employee data set with foreign ownership information from tax records to measure these direct and indirect effects. We find the average direct effect of a foreign multinational firm on its U.S. workers is a 7% increase in wages. This premium is larger for higher-skilled workers and for the employees of firms from high GDP per capita countries. We find evidence that it is membership in a multinational production network—instead of foreignness—that generates the foreign-firm premium. We leverage the past spatial clustering of foreign-owned firms by country of ownership to identify the indirect effects. An expansion in the foreign-multinational share of commuting-zone employment substantially increases the employment, value added, and—for higher-earning workers—wages at local domestic-owned firms. Per job created by a foreign multinational, our estimates suggest annual gains of US$13,400 to the aggregate wages of local incumbents, two-thirds of which are from indirect effects. Our estimates suggest that—via mega-deals for subsidies from local governments—foreign multinationals are able to extract a sizable fraction of the local surplus they generate.