理解高工资企业: 垄断、买方垄断与议价能力
Understanding High-Wage Firms: Monopoly, Monopsony, and Bargaining Power
American Economic Review · 2026 · [{"name": "Horng Chern Wong", "affiliation": ["Stockholm University"]}]
中文摘要
我研究企业市场势力与工人议价能力如何塑造工资与福利。利用法国微观数据, 我记录了工资与企业市场势力之间的若干关联模式, 而现有模型无法解释这些模式。一个企业生产纵向差异化产品并与工人分享利润的模型能够解释这些模式。该模型: (i) 揭示了估计买方垄断势力与议价能力的新挑战, 并提出一种替代方法; (ii) 表明企业特定冲击向工资的传导取决于冲击类型; (iii) 解释了加成率如何塑造企业工资溢价; (iv) 形式化刻画了增强工人议价能力如何影响工资与福利。(JEL D22, J31, J42, J52, L12, L22)
Abstract
I study how firm market power and worker bargaining power shape wages and welfare. Using French micro-data, I document patterns linking wages and firm market power that existing models cannot explain. A model in which firms produce vertically differentiated goods and share profits with workers explains those patterns. The model (i) reveals new challenges in estimating monopsony and bargaining power, proposing an alternative approach; (ii) shows that the passthrough of firm-specific shocks to wages depends on the type of shock; (iii) explains how markups shape firm wage premia; and (iv) formalizes how strengthening worker bargaining power affects wages and welfare. (JEL D22, J31, J42, J52, L12, L22)