Review of Economic Studies · 2022 · Daniel Garrett、Andrey Ordin、James W. Roberts、Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato
中文摘要
本文研究市政债券税收优惠与此类债券拍卖市场结构之间的相互作用。我们表明，这种相互作用会限制投标者攫取信息租金的能力，并且是决定州和地方政府借贷成本的关键因素。简约式估计表明，税收优惠增加3个百分点会使平均借贷成本降低9%–10%。我们估计了一个结构拍卖模型，以测算加价幅度，并说明和量化税收政策与投标者策略性行为之间的相互作用如何决定税收优惠对市政借贷成本的影响。我们使用估计所得模型评估奥巴马政府和特朗普政府限制市政债券税收优惠政策的效率。由于税收优惠的削减会推高投标者的加价幅度并抑制竞争，由此导致的市政借贷成本增幅超过了政府节省的税收支出。最后，我们使用该模型分析近期一项影响市政债券拍卖市场进入的非税收监管规定。
Abstract
Abstract We study the interaction between tax advantages for municipal bonds and the market structure of auctions for these bonds. We show that this interaction can limit a bidder’s ability to extract information rents and is a crucial determinant of state and local governments’ borrowing costs. Reduced-form estimates show that increasing the tax advantage by 3 pp lowers mean borrowing costs by 9–10$\%$. We estimate a structural auction model to measure markups and to illustrate and quantify how the interaction between tax policy and bidder strategic behaviour determines the impact of tax advantages on municipal borrowing costs. We use the estimated model to evaluate the efficiency of Obama and Trump administration policies that limit the tax advantage for municipal bonds. Because reductions in the tax advantage inflate bidder markups and depress competition, the resulting increase in municipal borrowing costs more than offsets the tax savings to the government. Finally, we use the model to analyse a recent non-tax regulation that affects entry into municipal bond auctions.