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Journal of Political Economy · 2024 · Erik Madsen、Nikhil Vellodi

中文摘要

我们研究数据使用监管如何影响数字市场中的创新。平台通常利用有关第三方卖家的专有数据来指导自身推出的竞争性产品,从而削弱创新激励。我们对这一互动进行建模,并刻画数据使用限制如何重塑这些激励。全面禁止数据使用可能促进创新,也可能抑制创新,这取决于新产品需求分布右尾的厚度。通过控制数据何时以及哪些数据可供使用,更具灵活性的规则总能提高监管的有效性。我们的研究结果为当前有关数字市场竞争的政策讨论作出了贡献。

Abstract

We study how regulating data usage impacts innovation in digital markets. Platforms commonly use proprietary data about third-party sellers to inform their own competing offerings, dampening incentives for innovation. We model this interaction and characterize how data usage restrictions reshape these incentives. An outright ban on data usage may boost or curtail innovation, depending on the thickness of the right tail of demand for new products. More flexible rules controlling when and what data are made available can always improve the effectiveness of regulation. Our results contribute to an ongoing policy discussion regarding competition in digital markets.
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