承诺不完全条件下的多维婚前投资

中文摘要

我们分析了当个人无法做出有约束力的承诺以与潜在配偶分享其劳动收入时，在人力资本和住房方面的婚前投资。如果在对自身劳动收入的议价能力上存在性别差异，或婚姻市场存在失衡，投资就会被扭曲。当事前议价能力偏向某一性别（例如中国的女性）而事后议价能力偏向另一性别（例如中国的男性）时，扭曲会被放大，因为男孩的父母会增加住房投资，以可信地承诺与男孩的潜在妻子分享更多资源，这可能会挤出人力资本投资。

Abstract

We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g., men in China), since parents of boys will increase housing investments in order to credibly commit to share more resources with the boy’s potential wife, possibly crowding out human capital investments.