Save, Spend, or Give? A Model of Housing, Family Insurance, and Savings in Old Age
中文摘要
住房与家庭如何塑造老年人的储蓄、支出与代际转移支付行为？利用健康与退休研究（Health and Retirement Study），我们记录到对子女的代际转移支付在很大程度上是后置的；房主负储蓄的速度远慢于租房者，但在入住养老院时往往出售住房；子女照护会延缓入住养老院，并与更大的遗赠（尤其是住房遗赠）相关。为解释这些事实，我们构建了一个动态、非合作的家庭模型，其中包含不可分割的住房资产，以及老年父母与其子女之间就父母的住房与照护安排进行的联合议价。该模型生成了现实的储蓄与照护选择，并与转移支付和房屋变现的时间相吻合。一个关键的新意在于住房作为承诺的渠道：在缺乏长期家庭合约的情况下，住房提供了一种承诺工具，以实现更有效率的储蓄。我们发现，这一渠道使老年期的住房自有率提高了三分之一，并使家庭对住房的支付意愿提高了5%–10%。这一机制还促进了非正式照护，放缓了支出，并带来更大的遗赠，这些含义我们都得到了经验支持。
Abstract
Abstract How do housing and family shape the savings, spending, and inter-generational transfer behaviour of the elderly? Using the Health and Retirement Study, we document that inter-generational transfers to children are substantially backloaded, that homeowners dis-save much more slowly than renters but often sell their houses when entering a nursing home, and that care by children slows down nursing home entry and is linked to larger bequests, particularly of housing. To rationalise these facts, we develop a dynamic, non-cooperative model of the family with an indivisible housing asset and joint bargaining between elderly parents and their children over the housing and care arrangements of the parents. The model generates realistic savings and care choices and matches the timing of transfers and home liquidations. A key novelty is the housing-as-commitment channel: In the absence of long-run family contracts, housing provides a commitment device for more efficient savings. We find that this channel increases homeownership in old age by one-third and families’ willingness to pay for houses by 5–10%. This mechanism also facilitates informal care, slows down spending, and leads to larger bequests, implications that we support empirically.