中文摘要
本文研究股权投资者和/或债权人的信念相对于规划者存在扭曲时的杠杆监管。我们刻画了投资者/债权人信念发生任意变化时最优监管如何作出响应，并将研究结果与实际情景相联系。我们表明，最优监管取决于此类变化的类型和幅度。投资者的乐观信念要求放松杠杆监管，而债权人的乐观信念，或投资者与债权人共同持有的乐观信念，则要求收紧杠杆监管。我们的结果适用于以下情形：（i）规划者并不完全了解投资者/债权人的信念；（ii）存在货币政策；（iii）存在救助和金钱外部性；以及（iv）信念内生。（JEL D62, D83, E52, G01, G21, G28, H81）
Abstract
This paper studies leverage regulation when equity investors and/or creditors have distorted beliefs relative to a planner. We characterize how the optimal regulation responds to arbitrary changes in investors’/creditors’ beliefs, relating our results to practical scenarios. We show that the optimal regulation depends on the type and magnitude of such changes. Optimism by investors calls for looser leverage regulation, while optimism by creditors, or jointly by both investors/creditors, calls for tighter leverage regulation. Our results apply to environments with (i) planners with imperfect knowledge of investors’/creditors’ beliefs, (ii) monetary policy, (iii) bailouts and pecuniary externalities, and (iv) endogenous beliefs. (JEL D62, D83, E52, G01, G21, G28, H81)