Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2021 · Simon Jäger、Benjamin Schoefer、Jörg Heining
中文摘要
我们估计了共同治理(codetermination)的工资效应,其形式为强制要求企业三分之一的董事会席位由工人代表担任。我们研究了德国的一项改革,该改革突然废除了1994年8月之后注册成立的股份公司的这一强制要求,而对略早于该时点成立的同类公司则保留了这一要求。我们的研究设计比较了改革前与改革后注册成立的公司队列;在一项稳健性检验中,我们借助了未受影响的公司类型(有限责任公司,LLC)中类似的差异。我们发现董事会层面的共同治理对工资及工资结构没有影响,即使在工资特别灵活的公司中也是如此。租金分享的程度和劳动份额同样不受影响。我们否定了撤资可能通过经典的敲竹杠(hold-up)渠道抵消工资效应的可能性,因为共同治理即便有影响,也是增加了资本形成。
Abstract
We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one-third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation.