中文摘要
在美国，联邦政府允许大学获取学生的联邦学生资助免费申请表（FAFSA），这为大规模价格歧视提供了便利。本文首次估计允许大学在定价决策中使用FAFSA信息所产生的后果。我构建并估计了一个大学定价的结构模型，并模拟了限制部分或全部FAFSA信息的反事实情景。我发现，如果FAFSA信息受到限制，就读于精英大学的学生中将有13%因定价过高而被低效率地排除在精英大学市场之外。尽管如此，由于大学会向大多数学生收取更低的价格，学生福利仍将提高。平均而言，大学确实利用FAFSA将资源从高收入学生转移给低收入学生，但这种再分配极不精准：允许大学使用FAFSA会损害三分之一低收入学生的利益，而高收入学生中实际上每七人就有一人从中受益。
Abstract
Abstract In the US, the federal government grants colleges access to a student’s Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) which facilitates substantial price discrimination. This article is the first to estimate the consequences of allowing colleges to use the FAFSA in their pricing decisions. I build and estimate a structural model of college pricing and simulate counterfactuals wherein some or all of the FAFSA information is restricted. I find that if FAFSA information were restricted, 13$\%$ of students attending elite colleges would be inefficiently priced out of the elite market. Nevertheless, student welfare would rise as colleges charged the majority of students lower prices. Colleges do use the FAFSA to transfer resources from high- to low-income students on average, but this redistribution is highly imprecise: allowing colleges to use the FAFSA harms one-third of low-income students while one in seven high-income students actually benefit.