The Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem
中文摘要
在许多情境下，激励错配与监督不足会导致员工采取自利行为。本文在能效家电更换项目的背景下，识别并量化了这一委托—代理问题的成本。我表明，受电力公司（委托人）雇用的承包商（代理人）通过故意误报项目数据以批准更换不合格冰箱，从而增加自身报酬。我估计，每台不合格更换会使项目收益减少106美元，且相比遵循项目准则的更换，节电量少30%。若同一项目不存在委托—代理扭曲，每台更换可使项目收益增加60美元。(JEL D82, L68, L94, L98)
Abstract
In many settings, misaligned incentives and inadequate monitoring lead employees to take self-interested actions. This paper identifies and quantifies the costs of this principal-agent problem in the context of an energy efficiency appliance replacement program. I show that contractors (agents) hired by the electric utility (the principal) increase their compensation by intentionally misreporting program data to authorize the replacement of nonqualified refrigerators. I estimate that each unqualified replacement reduces program benefits by $106 and saves 30 percent less electricity than replacements that follow program guidelines. The same program without a principal-agent distortion would increase program benefits by $60 per replacement. (JEL D82, L68, L94, L98)