American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023 · Morgan Hardy、Jamie McCasland
中文摘要
我们报告了一项田野实验的结果。该实验将失业青年随机安排到加纳的小型企业当学徒，除实物招聘服务外，不向企业（或劳动者）提供任何现金补贴。每提供一个学徒安置名额，处理组企业的规模约增加0.5名员工，利润约提高10%，这表明新手雇佣存在摩擦。我们将该项目解释为向企业提供了一种新型劳动者筛选技术，因为劳动者的（自愿）参与包含非货币申请成本，这与现有劳动力市场在招聘学徒时普遍采用入门费机制的做法相呼应。（JEL D22, J13, J23, L25, M51, M53, O14）
Abstract
We report the results of a field experiment that randomly placed unemployed young people as apprentices with small firms in Ghana and included no cash subsidy to firms (or workers) beyond in-kind recruitment services. Treated firms experienced increases in firm size of approximately half a worker and firm profits of approximately 10 percent for each apprentice placement offered, documenting frictions to novice hiring. We interpret the program as providing a novel worker screening technology to firms, as (voluntary) worker participation included nonmonetary application costs, echoing the widespread use of an entrance fee mechanism for hiring apprentices in the existing labor market. (JEL D22, J13, J23, L25, M51, M53, O14)