“挣来的，而非给予的”？降低完全退休年龄对退休决策的影响

中文摘要

本文分析了德国公共养老金制度2014年改革引发的行为反应。该改革将缴费年限较长者的完全退休年龄（FRA）最多降低两年，并将新的完全退休年龄设定为退休的参照年龄。利用公共养老金保险账户的行政数据，我们首先记录到，在完全退休年龄处存在显著的聚集反应，其幅度超出对照组83%。其次，我们在双重差分框架下表明，完全退休年龄降低1.0年，会使平均养老金申领年龄降低0.3–0.4年。与对照组个体相比，处理组个体的健康状况并未更差，面临流动性约束的可能性也未更高。我们的结果表明，对改革的强烈反应既源于新的完全退休年龄所发挥的参照点作用，也源于经济激励。改革的估计财政成本处于既有粗略估算区间的上端。

Abstract

This paper analyzes behavioral responses to a 2014 reform in the German public pension system that lowered the full retirement age (FRA) of individuals with a long contribution history by up to two years and framed the new FRA as reference age for retirement. Using administrative data from public pension insurance accounts, we first document a substantial bunching response at the FRA exceeding the control group’s bunching by 83%. Second, we show in a difference-in-difference setting that a 1.0 year decrease in the FRA leads to a reduction in the average pension claiming age by 0.3–0.4 years. Treated individuals neither have poorer health nor are more likely to be liquidity-constrained than individuals in the control group. Our results suggest that the strong responses to the reform are driven both by the new FRA serving as a reference point and by financial incentives. Estimated fiscal costs of the reform are at the upper end of the range of previous back-of-the-envelope calculations.