Is Secessionism Mostly About Income or Identity? A Global Analysis of 3,153 Subnational Regions
中文摘要
本文分析次国家地区的分离倾向主要是对人均收入差异作出反应，还是对不同的族群语言身份认同作出反应。我们在一个量化政治经济学模型中探讨这一问题；在该模型中，人们为公共品出资的意愿取决于其收入和身份认同。利用覆盖全球的高分辨率经济和语言数据，我们预测了177个国家3,153个次国家地区的分离倾向。我们使用关于分离主义运动、国家脆弱性、地区自治和冲突的数据，以及对苏联解体的应用分析，验证了基于模型的预测。反事实分析表明，消除族群语言身份认同差异会使支持分离的人口平均比例从10.1%降至0.2%，而消除收入差异则不会产生重大的量化影响。尽管这两种力量都会影响分离主义，但在决定一个地区的分离倾向时，身份认同的作用超过收入。
Abstract
Abstract This paper analyses whether the propensity to secede by subnational regions responds mostly to differences in income per capita or to distinct ethnolinguistic identities. We explore this question in a quantitative political economy model where people’s willingness to finance a public good depends on their income and identity. Using high-resolution economic and linguistic data for the entire globe, we predict the propensity to secede of 3,153 subnational regions in 177 countries. We validate the model-based predictions with data on secessionist movements, state fragility, regional autonomy and conflict, as well as with an application to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Counterfactual analysis shows that removing ethnolinguistic identity differences reduces the average support for secession from 10.1% to 0.2% of the population, while removing income differences has no major quantitative impact. Although both forces affect secessionism, identity trumps income in determining a region’s propensity to secede.