中文摘要
我们在一个能够再现私营企业对产出和不平等之重要性的经济中，研究最优资本所得税和财富税。如果企业家受到抵押品约束，他们将面临异质的回报率，从而使资本所得税与财富税之间产生实质性区别。我们发现，对资本所得征税优于对财富征税，因为财富税带来的效率收益被对较富有企业家的利润征税所产生的再分配收益所压倒。因此，对财富征税的收益较为有限。无论规划者对再分配的偏好如何，以及是否允许实行非线性税收，这一结论均具有稳健性。(JEL D31, H21, H23, H24, H25, K34, L26)
Abstract
We study optimal capital income and wealth taxation in an economy that reproduces the importance of private businesses for output and inequality. If entrepreneurs are subject to collateral constraints, they face heterogeneous rates of return, which generate a meaningful distinction between capital income and wealth taxation. We find that taxing capital income is preferable to taxing wealth because the efficiency gains from wealth taxation are swamped by the redistributional benefits of taxing the profits of richer entrepreneurs. Consequently, the gains from taxing wealth are modest. This conclusion is robust to the planner’s preference for redistribution and allowing for nonlinear taxes. (JEL D31, H21, H23, H24, H25, K34, L26)