American Economic Review · 2023 · Giuseppe Lopomo、Nicola Persico、Alessandro T. Villa
中文摘要
当低成本投标者同时也是低质量供应商时，采购中就会产生逆向选择。我们提出一种称为LoLA（低价抽奖拍卖）的机制；在存在逆向选择的情况下，该机制在某些条件下能够在满足激励相容约束的前提下，使买方剩余与社会剩余的任意组合最大化。LoLA设有底价和保留价。LoLA存在一个占优策略均衡，且在温和条件下该均衡是唯一的。在对意大利政府拍卖的反事实分析中，我们计算了相较于实际采用的第一价格拍卖，政府若采用最优采购机制（即LoLA）本可获得的收益。（JEL D44, D82, H57, L14）
Abstract
Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer’s and social surplus, subject to incentive compatibility, in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor price, and a reserve price. The LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild conditions, is unique. In a counterfactual analysis of Italian government auctions, we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal procurement mechanism (a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction (the adopted format). (JEL D44, D82, H57, L14)