Suing the government under weak rule of law: Evidence from administrative litigation reform in China
中文摘要
关于在法治薄弱的发展中国家加强司法独立是否有效，文献中长期存在争论。本文利用中国近期一项将行政诉讼管辖规则由区域内管辖改为跨区域管辖的司法改革，估计司法独立改善对保护私人主体免受公权力潜在滥用的影响。我们发现，改革后成功起诉地方政府的概率显著提高，尤其是在被告为权力较大的政府部门、原告为法律资源少于企业的公民个人时更为明显。但对于层级较高的政府，这一效应更为有限。改革还导致案件受理量增加、审理时间延长、司法质量提升。此外，改革提高了政府和公民双方的法治意识，促进了企业进入，并至少在短期内恶化了公众对地方政府的总体态度。我们的研究表明，跨区域管辖是党国体制下司法独立的一种新来源，同时也揭示了其潜在局限。
Abstract
There is a long-standing debate in the literature about the effectiveness of strengthening judicial independence in developing countries with weak rule of law. This paper exploits a recent Chinese judicial reform in administrative litigation, which changed the jurisdiction rule from intra-regional to trans-regional, to estimate the effects of improved judicial independence on protecting private entities against potential abuses of public authority. We find a significant increase in the probability of successfully suing local governments after the reform, especially when the defendants are more powerful government departments and when the plaintiffs are individual citizens with fewer legal resources than firms. But this effect is more limited for higher-level governments. The reform also results in increased case filings, prolonged trial time, and enhanced judicial quality. In addition, it raises the awareness of both governments and citizens about the rule of law, increases firm entry, and worsens general public attitudes toward local governments, at least in the short term. Our study highlights trans-regional jurisdiction as a new source of judicial independence in a party state and its potential limitations.