Identity breeds inequality: Evidence from a laboratory experiment on redistribution
Journal of Public Economics · 2023 · Urs Fischbacher、David Grammling、Jan Hausfeld、Vojtěch Zíka
中文摘要
政治日益受到身份认同分歧的驱动,这种分歧也影响着有关不平等与再分配的讨论。通常,再分配旨在减少不平等,这意味着再分配既不会让富者更富,也不会让原本的穷人成为新的富人。然而,如果身份认同影响再分配,这些限制可能不再具有约束力,再分配可能进一步加剧现有不平等(让富者更富),或逆转收入排序,使原本的穷人受益(如果再分配力度较强,这甚至可能加剧不平等)。在一项实验室实验中,我们采用一种新颖的平滑一维分配机制研究再分配,该机制也允许不平等程度的增加或逆转。决策者在实验过程中会获得有关受益者政治倾向、国籍或座位号的信息;我们还改变了收入不平等的结构和来源(收入或是劳动挣得、或是随机产生、或是不公平产生)。我们发现,决策者的大多数选择都涉及再分配,只有8%的选择维持现状。虽然大多数再分配选择降低了不平等,但更大的一部分——18%——通过让富者更富而加剧了不平等;13%的选择降低了总体不平等,但使穷人成为新的富人;另有9%的选择通过使穷人变得非常富有而加剧了不平等。因此,40%的决策属于常见再分配实验设计中通常无法观察到的再分配形式。内群体偏好总体上是再分配的强烈动机,也是促使再分配加剧或逆转不平等的最重要动机。事实上,在加剧或逆转不平等的决策中,85%惠及了内群体成员。补充的眼动追踪数据显示,决策者对受益者群体信息以及贫困离群者的关注,与更高水平的再分配相关。
Abstract
Politics is increasingly driven by identity cleavages, which also affect the discussion about inequality and redistribution. Typically, redistribution is meant to reduce inequality, implying that redistribution neither makes the rich richer nor the former poor the new rich. However, if identity affects redistribution, these limits might no longer be binding, and redistribution could further increase existing inequalities (making the rich richer) or reverse the income ordering to favor the once-poor (which can even be inequality increasing if redistribution is strong). In a laboratory experiment, we investigate redistribution via a novel smooth one-dimensional distribution mechanism that also allows for an increase or reversal of inequality. Decision-makers receive information about the recipients' political orientation, nationality, or seat number during the experiment, and we vary the structure and source of income inequality (income is either earned, random, or unfair). We find most choices of the decision-makers involve redistribution, with only 8 % of choices sticking with the status quo. While most redistribution choices reduce inequality, a larger share—(18 %)—increase inequality by making the rich richer, 13 % of choices reduce overall inequality but make the poor the new rich, and 9 % increase inequality by making the poor very rich. Thus, 40 % of decisions are redistributions that are typically unobserved in common redistribution designs. Ingroup favoritism is a strong motive for redistribution in general, and it is the most important motive for redistribution to increase or reverse inequality. Indeed, 85 % of the inequality-increasing or reversing decisions favor the ingroup. Complementary eye-tracking data show that decision-makers’ attention to information about the recipients’ groups and to poor outliers are related to higher levels of redistribution.