The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax Them*
中文摘要
本文提供了来自一个脆弱国家的证据，表明当政府试图向公民征税时，公民会要求在政府中拥有更多的话语权。我考察了一项在刚果一座大城市 356 个街区之间随机分配财产税征收的实地实验。此次税收行动是大多数公民首次被国家登记或被要求缴纳正式税款。它将财产税遵从率从对照组的 0.1% 提高到处理组的 11.6%。它还使政治参与提高了约 5 个百分点（31%）：被征税街区的公民更有可能参加政府主办的市政厅会议，或提交对政府绩效的评价。为以这些方式参与，普通公民承担了相当于其家庭日收入的成本，处理组公民的支出比对照组多 43%。处理组公民还对省政府进行了积极的信念更新，认为其收入更多、漏损更少，且提供公共品的责任更大。研究结果表明，拓宽税基具有“参与红利”——这是关于近代早期欧洲包容性治理兴起的历史叙述中的一个关键思想，也是捐助方支持弱国税收项目的常见理由。
Abstract
Abstract This article provides evidence from a fragile state that citizens demand more of a voice in the government when it tries to tax them. I examine a field experiment randomizing property tax collection across 356 neighborhoods of a large Congolese city. The tax campaign was the first time most citizens had been registered by the state or asked to pay formal taxes. It raised property tax compliance from 0.1% in control to 11.6% in treatment. It also increased political participation by about 5 percentage points (31%): citizens in taxed neighborhoods were more likely to attend town hall meetings hosted by the government or submit evaluations of its performance. To participate in these ways, the average citizen incurred costs equal to their daily household income, and treated citizens spent 43% more than control. Treated citizens also positively updated about the provincial government, perceiving more revenue, less leakage, and a greater responsibility to provide public goods. The results suggest that broadening the tax base has a “participation dividend,” a key idea in historical accounts of the emergence of inclusive governance in early modern Europe and a common justification for donor support of tax programs in weak states.