Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2020 · Simon Jäger、Benjamin Schoefer、Samuel G. Young、Josef Zweimüller
中文摘要
非就业通常被视为议价和工资张贴等工资设定模型中劳动者的外部选择。因此，非就业的价值是工资的一个关键决定因素。我们衡量了非就业价值的变化对初始处于就业状态的劳动者工资的影响。非就业价值的准实验变异源于奥地利对失业保险（UI）给付水平的四次重大改革。我们发现，工资对失业保险给付的变化并不敏感：点估计表明，失业保险给付每增加 1.00 美元，工资的响应不足 0.01 美元，且我们可以拒绝大于 0.03 美元的敏感度。即使对于工资较低、预测失业持续时间较长的劳动者，以及从失业状态中受雇的换工作者，这种不敏感性依然存在。工资对非就业价值不敏感，这对广泛使用的纳什议价模型构成了一个难题，因为该模型预测的敏感度为 0.24–0.48 美元。我们的证据支持使工资不受非就业价值影响的工资设定模型。
Abstract
Abstract Nonemployment is often posited as a worker’s outside option in wage-setting models such as bargaining and wage posting. The value of nonemployment is therefore a key determinant of wages. We measure the wage effect of changes in the value of nonemployment among initially employed workers. Our quasi-experimental variation in the value of nonemployment arises from four large reforms of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels in Austria. We document that wages are insensitive to UI benefit changes: point estimates imply a wage response of less than $0.01 per $1.00 UI benefit increase, and we can reject sensitivities larger than $0.03. The insensitivity holds even among workers with low wages and high predicted unemployment duration, and among job switchers hired out of unemployment. The insensitivity of wages to the nonemployment value presents a puzzle to the widely used Nash bargaining model, which predicts a sensitivity of $0.24–$0.48. Our evidence supports wage-setting models that insulate wages from the value of nonemployment.