中文摘要
我们能否通过投资海堤、高脚屋或其他形式的适应措施来减少气候变化造成的损害？聚焦美国强风暴这一情形，我构建了一个宏观异质性主体模型，以量化适应、联邦灾害政策与气候变化之间的相互作用。该模型偏离了标准的气候损害函数，将风暴造成的损害纳入其中，视之为特质性冲击的实现。利用校准后的模型，我推断适应资本约占美国资本存量的1%。我发现，尽管灾害援助引致的道德风险效应减少了美国经济中的适应投入，但联邦政府对适应投资的补贴对道德风险的纠正有余。我将气候变化作为风暴严重程度或发生概率（或二者兼有）的永久性上升引入模型。适应措施将这种气候变化造成的损害减少了约三分之一。最后，我表明，对气候损害中的特质性风险成分进行建模，会对适应以及气候变化的福利成本产生定量上重要的含义。
Abstract
Abstract Can we reduce the damage from climate change by investing in seawalls, stilts, or other forms of adaptation? Focusing on the case of severe storms in the US, I develop a macro heterogeneous-agent model to quantify the interactions between adaptation, federal disaster policy, and climate change. The model departs from the standard climate damage function and incorporates the damage from storms as the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. Using the calibrated model, I infer that adaptation capital comprises approximately 1$\%$ of the US capital stock. I find that while the moral hazard effects from disaster aid reduce adaptation in the US economy, federal subsidies for investment in adaptation more than correct for the moral hazard. I introduce climate change into the model as a permanent increase in either or both the severity or probability of storms. Adaptation reduces the damage from this climate change by approximately one-third. Finally, I show that modelling the idiosyncratic risk component of climate damage has quantitatively important implications for adaptation and for the welfare cost of climate change.