← ireadpaper · 顶刊中的公共政策研究

动态竞选中政策公告的最优时机*

Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns*
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2020 · Yuichiro Kamada、Takuo Sugaya

中文摘要

我们构建了一个动态竞选模型。在该模型中,候选人修正或澄清其政策立场的机会是有限的,并在竞选进程中随机到来,直至预先确定的选举日。我们表明,这一简单的摩擦会产生丰富而微妙的竞选动态。我们首先在一系列被扩展至动态设定的经典静态选举模型中展示这些效应,其中包括具有候选人资能因素的模型和多维政策空间模型。随后,我们提出了构成这些模型结果基础的一般性原理。特别是,我们证明,在均衡中,候选人在竞选期间会长期使用模糊语言。

Abstract

Abstract We construct a dynamic model of election campaigns. In the model, opportunities for candidates to refine/clarify their policy positions are limited and arrive stochastically along the course of the campaign until the predetermined election date. We show that this simple friction leads to rich and subtle campaign dynamics. We first demonstrate these effects in a series of canonical static models of elections that we extend to dynamic settings, including models with valence and a multidimensional policy space. We then present general principles that underlie the results from those models. In particular, we establish that candidates spend a long time using ambiguous language during the election campaign in equilibrium.
在 ireadpaper 查看全部 →