Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2020 · Ricardo J. Caballero、Alp Simsek
中文摘要
我们为新凯恩斯主义模型提供了一种连续时间的“以风险为中心”的表述,并用其分析当产出由总需求决定时,资产价格、金融投机与宏观经济结果之间的相互作用。原则上,利率政策在应对资产估值冲击方面非常有效。然而在实践中,货币政策面临多种约束。如果这些约束十分严重,风险资产估值下降便会引发需求衰退。需求衰退会减少盈利,并在资产价格与总需求之间形成负反馈循环。在衰退阶段,平均信念至关重要,因为它们不仅影响资产估值,还决定放大机制的强度。在事前繁荣阶段,信念分歧(或异质性资产估值)至关重要,因为它们会促使投资者进行投机。当经济转入衰退时,这种投机会减少高估值投资者的财富,进而压低财富加权的平均信念,从而加剧崩盘。在繁荣时期限制投机的宏观审慎政策,可以通过提高衰退时期的资产价格和总需求,实现帕累托福利改善。
Abstract
Abstract We provide a continuous-time “risk-centric” representation of the New Keynesian model, which we use to analyze the interactions between asset prices, financial speculation, and macroeconomic outcomes when output is determined by aggregate demand. In principle, interest rate policy is highly effective in dealing with shocks to asset valuations. However, in practice monetary policy faces a wide range of constraints. If these constraints are severe, a decline in risky asset valuations generates a demand recession. This reduces earnings and generates a negative feedback loop between asset prices and aggregate demand. In the recession phase, average beliefs matter because they not only affect asset valuations but also determine the strength of the amplification mechanism. In the ex ante boom phase, belief disagreements (or heterogeneous asset valuations) matter because they induce investors to speculate. This speculation exacerbates the crash by reducing high-valuation investors’ wealth when the economy transitions to recession, which depresses (wealth-weighted) average beliefs. Macroprudential policy that restricts speculation in the boom can Pareto improve welfare by increasing asset prices and aggregate demand in the recession.