不完全合同下的竞争与采购政策设计
Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies
American Economic Review · 2026 · [{"name": "Rodrigo Carril", "affiliation": ["Universitat Pompeu Fabra", "Barcelona School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Andrés González-Lira", "affiliation": ["Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile"]}, {"name": "Michael S. Walker", "affiliation": ["United States Department of Defense"]}]
中文摘要
我们研究在美国国防采购背景下加剧合同竞争的影响。利用一项强制机构公布特定合同机会的不连续性规定，我们发现，扩大投标者范围会降低授标价格，但会使授标后的履约表现恶化，表现为成本超支与延期。我们构建并估计了一个包含内生进入与随机执行绩效的拍卖模型，其中买方内生地选择竞争强度。模型估计表明，承包商之间的绩效存在显著异质性，并显示对现行规定进行简单调整即可在采购支出上带来可观的节省。(JEL D22, D24, D44, D82, D86, H56, H57)
Abstract
We study the effects of intensifying competition for contracts in the context of US Defense procurement. Leveraging a discontinuous regulation that mandates agencies to publicize certain contract opportunities, we document that expanding the set of bidders reduces award prices but deteriorates post-award performance in terms of cost overruns and delays. We develop and estimate an auction model with endogenous entry and stochastic execution performance, in which the buyer endogenously chooses the intensity of competition. Model estimates indicate substantial heterogeneity in performance across contractors and show that simple adjustments to the current regulation could provide significant savings in procurement spending. (JEL D22, D24, D44, D82, D86, H56, H57)