American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2022 · Jessica Goldberg、Mario Macis、Pradeep K. Chintagunta
中文摘要
我们研究同伴转介是否以及如何提高筛查率和检测率，并促进结核病患者的识别。结核病是一种每年造成逾百万人死亡的传染病。我们在印度122家结核病治疗中心开展了一项涉及3,176名患者的实验，结果发现，小额经济激励提高了现有患者转介潜在患者接受筛查和检测的概率，从而以具有成本效益的方式识别出新病例。受到激励的同伴转介通过两种机制发挥作用：一是同伴掌握有关其社交网络中哪些个体适合作为定向外展接触对象的私人信息；二是在促使这些个体接受检测方面，同伴比卫生工作者更有效。（JEL H51、I12、I18、O15、Z13）
Abstract
We study whether and how peer referrals increase screening, testing, and identification of patients with tuberculosis, an infectious disease responsible for over one million deaths annually. In an experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment centers in India, we find that small financial incentives raise the probability that existing patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in cost-effective identification of new cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks to target for outreach, and they are more effective than health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested. (JEL H51, I12, I18, O15, Z13)