策略性正规部门裁员：失业保险与非正规劳动力市场

中文摘要

本文利用巴西的一项失业保险改革，研究非正规劳动力市场存在时失业保险（UI）的激励效应。我们发现，获得失业保险金领取资格使正规部门裁员增加了11%。新增裁员大多与工人转入非正规就业有关。我们还记录到与从失业保险制度中套取租金相一致的正规部门裁员和召回模式：工人在取得失业保险金领取资格时被裁员，并在失业保险金停止发放时被召回。在劳动力市场非正规化程度较高的行业和市镇中，这些模式更为明显。（JEL：J22、J46、J63、J65、K31、O15）

Abstract

Exploiting an unemployment insurance reform in Brazil, we study incentive effects of UI in the presence of informal labor markets. We find that eligibility for UI benefits increases formal layoffs by 11 percent. Most of the additional layoffs are related to workers transitioning to informal employment. We further document formal layoff and recall patterns consistent with rent extraction from the UI system. Workers are laid off as they become eligible for UI benefits and recalled when benefits cease. These patterns are stronger for industries and municipalities with a high degree of labor market informality. (JEL J22, J46, J63, J65, K31, O15)