Journal of Political Economy · 2025 · [{"name": "Jason Choi", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Rishabh Kirpalani", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Diego J. Perez", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
美国政府是全球安全资产的主要供给者，并面临对其债务向下倾斜的需求。本文考察美国在发行债务时是否行使其市场力量，并研究由此产生的宏观经济后果。我们构建了一个全球经济模型，其中美国公共债务为其持有者带来非货币价值；我们分析了美国政府作为该安全资产垄断供给者时的均衡，并将此情形与美国政府作为价格接受者时的情形进行对比。我们利用高波动与低波动状态下所估计的美国债务需求弹性的变化，在实证上区分这两个模型，发现数据拒绝价格接受行为而支持垄断行为。随后，我们量化了市场力量所导致的扭曲，发现其造成安全资产的显著供给不足、便利收益（convenience yield）中相当大的加价，以及美国获得巨大福利收益而以世界其他地区受损为代价。最后，我们研究了来自其他主权国家与私人机构的安全资产竞争加剧所带来的影响。*本文此前的一版草稿以《美国在安全资产中的市场力量的宏观经济含义》为题流传。我们感谢 Manuel Amador、Andy Atkeson、Anmol Bhandari、V. V. Chari、Chris Conlon、Marco Duarte、Simon Gilchrist、Oleg Itskhoki、Rohan Kekre、Arvind Krishnamurthy、Zhengyang Jiang、Ricardo Lagos、Hyunju Lee、Hanno Lustig、Matteo Maggiori、Lorenzo Magnolfi、Dmitry Mukhin、Chris Sullivan 和 Venky Venkateswaran，以及众多研讨会与会议参与者提出的宝贵意见与建议。我们也感谢 Duong Dang 提供出色的研究协助。
Abstract
The US government is the dominant supplier of global safe assets and faces a downward sloping demand for its debt. In this paper, we ask if the US exercises its market power when issuing debt, and we study its macroeconomic consequences. We develop a model of the global economy in which US public debt generates a nonpecuniary value for its holders, analyze the equilibrium in which the US government is themonopoly provider of this safe asset, and contrast this casewith the one inwhich the US government acts as a price taker. We use variation in estimated demand elasticities for US debt during highand low-volatility regimes to empirically distinguish between these two models and find that the data reject the price-taking behavior in favor of the monopoly one. We then quantify the distortions due to market power and find that it generates a significant underprovision of safe assets, a sizable markup in the convenience yield, and large welfare benefits for the US to the detriment of the rest of the world. Finally, we study the implications of increasing competition in safe assets from other sovereigns and private institutions. ∗Aprevious draft of this paper circulated under the title “TheMacroeconomic Implications of USMarket Power in Safe Assets.” We thank Manuel Amador, Andy Atkeson, Anmol Bhandari, V. V. Chari, Chris Conlon, Marco Duarte, Simon Gilchrist, Oleg Itskhoki, Rohan Kekre, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Zhengyang Jiang, Ricardo Lagos, Hyunju Lee, Hanno Lustig, Matteo Maggiori, Lorenzo Magnolfi, Dmitry Mukhin, Chris Sullivan, and Venky Venkateswaran, as well as numerous seminar and conference participants, for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Duong Dang for superb research assistance.