Annual Review of Economics · 2014 · Jishnu Das、Jeffrey S. Hammer
中文摘要
关于公立和私立初级卫生保健机构医疗服务质量的新研究,显著丰富了我们对低收入和中等收入国家医疗服务提供方式的理解。首先,本文总结了质量衡量方面的最新进展,并区分了对服务提供者知识与服务提供者努力的衡量。其次,本文考察了低收入环境下诊疗实践质量差异的决定因素,强调了基础设施、包括药品在内的物资供应以及服务提供者培训等结构性约束所发挥的有限作用——这些因素构成了当今全球卫生政策中很大一部分的主要支柱。相比之下,诊疗实践质量的差异显然与服务提供者的努力相关;服务提供者的努力是其行为的一个方面,可以通过多种手段加以改变。第三,本文提出了一个宽泛的经济学框架来解释这些发现。我们考察初级卫生保健服务提供中是否存在特定市场失灵的证据,并强调关键困难在于医疗建议具有特定于每次诊疗交易的性质——过去如此,现在亦然。服务提供者可能做得过多,也可能做得过少,或二者兼有;每种情况的程度均取决于具体患者和具体疾病。我们具体说明了消费者和政府为何难以监督每一次诊疗交易,从而发现可能存在的不当行为。
Abstract
New research on the quality of care in public and private primary care facilities has significantly enriched our understanding of how health care is delivered in low- and middle-income countries. First, this article summarizes recent advances in the measurement of quality, distinguishing between measurements of provider knowledge and provider effort. Second, it looks at the determinants of practice quality variation in low-income settings, highlighting the limited role of structural constraints such as infrastructure, the supply of materials including drugs, and provider training—the mainstay of much of global health policy today. In contrast, practice quality variation is clearly linked to provider effort, an aspect of provider behavior that can be altered through a variety of means. Third, it provides a broad economic framework to interpret the findings. We look for evidence of specific market failures in the provision of primary care and emphasize that the key difficulty is (and always was) the transaction-specific nature of medical advice. Providers can do too much or too little (or both), and the extent of either depends on the specific patient and the specific disease. We document specific ways in which it is difficult for both consumers and governments to monitor every transaction to detect potentially errant behavior.