Annual Review of Economics · 2014 · George Loewenstein、Cass R. Sunstein、Russell Golman
中文摘要
我们回顾了考察强制公开披露信息的法律法规之效果的相关文献。这类要求最适合用于存在激励不一致和信息不对称的情形，例如买方与卖方之间，或顾问与接受建议者之间。我们首先回顾与此类信息披露有关的经济学文献，继而讨论各种心理因素如何使经济学预测变得复杂，并在某些情况下彻底改变这些预测。例如，信息接收者的有限注意力、动机性注意以及对概率的有偏评估，都可能显著削弱、甚至逆转信息披露要求的预期效果。在许多情况下，信息披露对信息接收者影响不大，却会显著影响信息提供者的行为；这种影响有时使行为向好，有时则使其变差。我们回顾的研究表明，简化披露、标准化披露、生动化披露以及提供社会比较信息，均可用于提高信息披露政策的有效性。
Abstract
We review literature examining the effects of laws and regulations that require public disclosure of information. These requirements are most sensibly imposed in situations characterized by misaligned incentives and asymmetric information between, for example, a buyer and seller or an advisor and advisee. We review the economic literature relevant to such disclosure and then discuss how different psychological factors complicate, and in some cases radically change, the economic predictions. For example, limited attention, motivated attention, and biased assessments of probability on the part of information recipients can significantly diminish, or even reverse, the intended effects of disclosure requirements. In many cases, disclosure does not much affect the recipients of the information but does significantly affect the behavior of the providers, sometimes for the better and sometimes for the worse. We review research suggesting that simplified disclosure, standardized disclosure, vivid disclosure, and social comparison information can all be used to enhance the effectiveness of disclosure policies.