中文摘要
人工智能正日益被用于提供政治建议。我们研究一种人工智能：它对与收益相关的状态掌握着更充分的信息，并且既关心准确性，也关心其所建议个体的感知福利。因此，人工智能有动机使建议偏向个体愿意相信的内容，从而改变其信息的政治内容和信息量。理性的个体会预见到这种扭曲，并过滤掉其中可预测的政治成分；但他们获得的信息仍然较少，因为人工智能降低了其信息对状态的响应性。低估这种激励的个体则会将政治迎合误认为信息，使政治偏好扭曲事实信念，并导致两极分化和激进化。该模型还表明，信息掌握得更充分的个体会收到信息量更大、政治偏向更小的建议；与此同时，更高的理性程度虽然能够改善对信息的解读，却可能恶化沟通本身。与常见的“回音室”直觉相反，当政治偏好与先验信念一致时，政治扭曲会得到缓解；当二者相背离时，政治扭曲的影响最大。我们说明，通过分别独立改变个体所陈述的偏好和先验信念，即使无法操纵潜在状态，也可以识别出人工智能的信息对状态的响应性。
Abstract
Artificial intelligence is increasingly used for political advice. We study an AI that is better informed about a payoff-relevant state and cares both about accuracy and about the perceived welfare of the individual it advises. The AI then has an incentive to tilt advice toward what the individual would like to believe, altering both the political content and the informativeness of its messages. Sophisticated individuals anticipate this distortion and filter out its predictable political component, yet still learn less because the AI makes its messages less responsive to the state. Individuals who underestimate the incentive instead mistake political accommodation for information, allowing political preferences to distort factual beliefs and generate polarization and radicalization. The model also shows that better-informed individuals receive more informative and less politically tilted advice, while greater sophistication can improve interpretation yet worsen communication itself. Contrary to the familiar echo-chamber intuition, political distortion is mitigated when political preferences and prior beliefs coincide and is most consequential when they diverge. We show how independently varying individuals’ stated preferences and prior beliefs can recover the AI’s responsiveness to the state even when the underlying state cannot be manipulated.