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银行危机后的永久性资本损失

Permanent Capital Losses after Banking Crises
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2025 · Matthew Baron、Luc Laeven、Julien Pénasse、Yevhenii Usenko

中文摘要

我们研究了46个经济体历次银行危机中导致银行损失的机制,以及政策干预在恢复银行资本充足水平方面的有效性。我们发现,危机爆发时银行股价会出现大幅且永久性的下跌。这些损失预示着银行盈利和股息将出现幅度相当的长期下降,而非未来股票回报率上升。银行损失主要由不良资产减记所致,而非恐慌期间的资产出售所致。危机期间强有力的基于流动性的干预措施仅能预测银行市场价值小幅、暂时性的上升。总体而言,这些结果表明,危机期间的银行损失主要并非源于暂时性的价格错位。早期流动性干预能够避免银行危机,但仅限于特定条件。一旦银行股权价值已经大幅下降,历史上的政策应对便未能防止银行业长期资本不足。

Abstract

Abstract We study the mechanisms driving bank losses across historical banking crises in 46 economies and the effectiveness of policy interventions in restoring bank capitalization. We find that bank stocks experience large, permanent declines at the onset of crises. These losses predict commensurate long-term declines in banks’ earnings and dividends, rather than elevated future equity returns. Bank losses are primarily driven by write-downs of nonperforming assets, not asset sales during panics. Forceful liquidity-based interventions during crises predict only small, temporary increases in bank market value. Overall, these results suggest that bank losses during crises are not primarily due to temporary price dislocations. Early liquidity interventions can avert banking crises, but only under specific conditions. Once large bank equity declines have occurred, policy responses have historically failed to prevent persistent undercapitalization in the banking sector.
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