失败的银行
Failing Banks
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Sérgio D. Correia", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond"]}, {"name": "Stephan Luck", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of New York"]}, {"name": "Emil Verner", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
摘要 银行为何倒闭?我们构建了一个覆盖1863年至2024年间大多数商业银行的面板数据,以研究美国倒闭银行的历史。倒闭银行的共同特征是资产损失不断上升、偿付能力持续恶化,以及对昂贵的非核心融资的依赖日益增加。这些共性意味着,利用公开财务报表中的简单会计指标即可高度预测银行倒闭。在存款保险出现之前,伴随挤兑的银行倒闭十分常见,但这类倒闭与薄弱的基本面密切相关,这令人对非基本面挤兑的重要性产生怀疑。此外,倒闭银行资产的低回收率表明,除非接管清算过程造成了巨大的价值毁损,否则大多数遭遇挤兑的倒闭银行本已资不抵债。总体而言,我们的证据表明,银行倒闭与银行业危机的主要原因,几乎在任何时候、任何地方都是银行基本面的恶化。
Abstract
Abstract Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. These commonalities imply that bank failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Failures with runs were common before deposit insurance, but these failures are strongly related to weak fundamentals, casting doubt on the importance of non-fundamental runs. Furthermore, low recovery rates on failed banks’ assets suggest that most failed banks subject to runs were fundamentally insolvent, barring large value destruction of receiverships. Altogether, our evidence suggests that the primary cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always and everywhere a deterioration of bank fundamentals.
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