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银行为何倒闭

Failing Banks
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2025 · Sérgio D. Correia、Stephan Luck、Emil Verner

中文摘要

银行为何会倒闭?本文构建了一个覆盖1863年至2024年间美国绝大多数商业银行的面板数据集,以研究美国银行倒闭的历史。倒闭银行的共同特征是:资产损失不断上升、偿付能力持续恶化,以及对高成本非核心融资的依赖日益增强。这些共性意味着,仅凭公开财务报表中的简单会计指标,即可高度准确地预测银行倒闭。在存款保险制度建立之前,伴随挤兑发生的银行倒闭十分常见,但这些倒闭与薄弱的基本面密切相关,这使人们对非基本面挤兑的重要性产生怀疑。此外,倒闭银行资产的低回收率表明,除非接管清算造成了巨大的价值损毁,否则大多数遭遇挤兑的倒闭银行在基本面上已经资不抵债。总体而言,本文的证据表明,银行倒闭与银行业危机的首要原因,几乎在任何时间和地点都是银行基本面的恶化。

Abstract

Abstract Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. These commonalities imply that bank failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Failures with runs were common before deposit insurance, but these failures are strongly related to weak fundamentals, casting doubt on the importance of non-fundamental runs. Furthermore, low recovery rates on failed banks’ assets suggest that most failed banks subject to runs were fundamentally insolvent, barring large value destruction of receiverships. Altogether, our evidence suggests that the primary cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always and everywhere a deterioration of bank fundamentals.
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