Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2026 · Natalie Bau、Gaurav Khanna、Corinne Low、Alessandra Voena
中文摘要
本文利用新收集的嫁妆分配数据，考察嫁妆在化解印度围绕迁移产生的代际摩擦中的作用。迁移打破了传统的养老支持结构；在这一结构中，儿子居住在父母附近，并在父母年老时照料他们。我们构建了一个模型，其中嫁妆可以让儿子预先向父母进行转移，缓解收入共享约束，从而促进迁移。为检验这一假说，我们收集了两个新的数据集，用于衡量嫁妆在家庭成员之间的分配情况。我们首次记录到，向男方父母进行嫁妆净转移的情况很常见，但远非普遍。与将嫁妆用于收入共享的解释相一致，当儿子迁移时，此类转移更常发生，尤其是在儿子从事收入更高的职业时。具有全国代表性的数据表明，历史上嫁妆传统更强的地区迁移率更高。最后，利用一项大规模公路建设计划，我们表明，当迁移成本下降时，来自历史上嫁妆传统更强地区的男性会更多地迁移。我们的发现为解释嫁妆为何尽管存在已有充分文献记载的不利后果却仍然延续，提供了一些线索。
Abstract
Abstract This paper uses newly collected data on the allocation of dowry to examine its role in resolving intergenerational frictions around migration in India. Migration disrupts traditional elderly support structures, in which sons live near their parents and care for them in old age. We develop a model in which dowry can promote migration by allowing sons to make upfront transfers to their parents and ease constraints on income sharing. To test this hypothesis, we collect two new data sets that measure the distribution of dowry between family members. We document for the first time that net transfers of dowry to a man’s parents are common but far from universal. Consistent with using dowry for income sharing, such transfers occur more often when sons migrate, especially when they work in higher-earning occupations. In nationally representative data, migration rates are higher in areas with stronger historical dowry traditions. Finally, exploiting a large-scale highway construction program, we show that men from areas with stronger historical dowry traditions migrate more when migration costs fall. Our findings provide some clues as to why dowry persists despite its well-documented adverse consequences.