Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing
中文摘要
本文比较了非正式谈判达成的油气租赁与通过集中拍卖授予的油气租赁的结果。我们聚焦于德克萨斯州，该州在20世纪初的立法决定将数千个相邻地块分配至不同的矿产配置机制。我们表明，在数十年后意外开始的水力压裂热潮期间，拍卖租赁产生的前期付款至少比谈判租赁高55%，产量高出40%。这些结果表明，在传统上以非结构化方式进行分配的市场（包括更广泛的3万亿美元私有矿产市场）中，采用集中的正式机制具有巨大的潜在收益。（JEL D44, L71, Q35）
Abstract
This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 55 percent larger up-front payments and 40 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals. (JEL D44, L71, Q35)