中文摘要
成年子女提供的非正式护理替代了正式的长期护理服务。然而，在仅为正式护理提供支付的长期护理保险定价中，并未使用关于子女的信息。我首先提供描述性证据，表明关于子女非正式护理可能性的私人信息导致了逆向选择：该市场吸引了不成比例的个体，这些个体因接受子女护理的概率较低而面临更高的正式护理利用风险。为了量化逆向选择的福利后果，我构建并估计了一个动态代际模型，该模型包含长期护理保险、储蓄、非正式护理提供和就业选择。基于估计的均衡保险市场框架，我表明在保险合约定价中使用关于子女的信息减少了逆向选择，并带来每个家庭平均6,200美元的福利收益。利用模型的非合作特征，我还量化了父母在多大程度上放弃长期护理保险，以避免削弱子女提供非正式护理的激励。
Abstract
Abstract Informal care provided by adult children substitutes for formal long-term care services. However, information about children is not used in pricing long-term care insurance which pays only for formal care. I start by providing descriptive evidence that private information about children’s informal care likelihood results in adverse selection: the market attracts a disproportionate number of individuals who face higher formal care utilization risk due to a lower probability of receiving care from their children. To quantify the welfare consequence of adverse selection, I develop and estimate a dynamic intergenerational model featuring long-term care insurance, savings, informal care provision, and employment choices. Based on the estimated equilibrium insurance market framework, I show that using information about children in pricing insurance contracts reduces adverse selection and results in the average welfare gain of $6,200 per family. Using the non-cooperative feature of the model, I also quantify to what extent parents forgo long-term care insurance to avoid diminishing children’s informal care incentive.