American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2023 · Yiming Cao、Raymond Fisman、Hui Lin、Yong‐Xiang Wang
中文摘要
我们研究中国国有银行经理的放贷激励如何影响对国有企业（SOEs）的放贷。我们发现，月末放贷数量增加，而贷款质量下降，这表明存在使放贷标准降低的月度放贷目标。放贷数量的增加来自对国有企业和私营部门的放贷，而贷款质量的下降仅来自对国有企业的放贷；这些国有企业即使此前发生过违约，仍能继续获得贷款，尤其是在月末。我们据此提出，对国有企业放贷可能有利于国有银行经理：他们向逾期未还款的国有企业放贷以完成目标，而这反过来可能加剧国有企业的软预算约束。（JEL G21, G28, L32, O16, P34）
Abstract
We study how Chinese state bank managers’ lending incentives impact lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We show lending quantity increases and quality decreases at month’s end, indicating monthly lending targets that decrease lending standards. Increased quantity comes from both SOEs and private lending, whereas decreased quality is from only SOEs, which continue to receive loans even after prior defaults (particularly at month’s end). We suggest that SOE lending may thus be beneficial for state bank managers, who lend to delinquent state enterprises to meet targets, which in turn may exacerbate SOEs’ soft budget constraints. (JEL G21, G28, L32, O16, P34).