The Extension of Credit with Nonexclusive Contracts and Sequential Banking Externalities
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2023 · Giacomo De Giorgi、Andrés Drenik、Enrique Seira
中文摘要
非排他性序列借贷会增加违约并对先前的贷款人施加外部性。我们记录了序列银行业务普遍存在且具有实质性影响。使用一家大型银行的信用卡申请数据以及申请人整体贷款组合数据，我们发现增加一条信贷额度会导致高信用评分借款人在先前贷款上的违约下降5.9个百分点。然而，对于低信用评分借款人，这会导致违约增加19个百分点。前者利用新增信贷平滑既有贷款的还款，而后者增加了其总债务。这些结果对“无普遍违约”监管和金融普惠具有启示意义。（JEL D62, D82, G21, G51）
Abstract
Nonexclusive sequential borrowing can increase default and impose externalities on prior lenders. We document that sequential banking is pervasive with substantial effects. Using credit card applications from a large bank and data on the applicants’ entire loan portfolios, we find that an additional credit line causes a 5.9 percentage point decline in default for high-score borrowers on previous loans. However, for low-score borrowers, it causes a 19 percentage point increase. The former use the new credit to smooth payments on preexisting loans, while the latter increase their total debt. These results have implications for “ no-universal-default” regulation and financial inclusion. (JEL D62, D82, G21, G51)