亏损税收处理的不对称性对S公司所有者的影响

中文摘要

我们研究S公司所有者面临的亏损税收处理不对称性。这些所有者在当期利用大部分亏损抵税，因此，其面临的税收处理不对称性小于C公司。然而，累进个人所得税税率表仍使这些所有者面临扭曲。这种不对称性的价值每年约为35亿美元。我们发现，这种不对称性削弱了进行风险性投资的激励，并导致发生亏损与获得盈利的所有者之间的资源配置低效率。最后，我们模拟了《减税与就业法案》某些条款的影响；据我们估计，这些条款，尤其是第199A条，减轻了这种不对称性对S公司所有者造成的行为扭曲。

Abstract

We study tax loss asymmetry for S corporate owners. These owners use most losses contemporaneously, reducing the tax asymmetry compared to C corporations. However, these owners face distortions due to the progressive individual tax schedule. The value of this asymmetry is approximately $3.5 billion per year. We find that this asymmetry creates disincentives for risky investment and causes allocative inefficiencies among loss and gains owners. Finally, we simulate the effects of certain provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act; we estimate that these provisions—especially section 199A—reduce the behavioral distortions of the asymmetry for S corporate owners. (JEL D22, G32, H25, H32, K34)