American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2023 · Marcelo Bérgolo、Rodrigo Ceni、Guillermo Cruces、Matías Giaccobasso、Ricardo Pérez-Truglia
中文摘要
Allingham 和 Sandmo（1972）的经典模型预测，企业通过对逃税的成本与收益进行最优权衡来逃税。然而，尚无直接证据表明企业会以这种方式对稽查作出反应。为研究这一问题，我们与税务机关合作开展了一项大规模实地实验。我们向20,440家中小企业发送了信函，这些企业每年合计缴纳的税款超过2亿美元。我们发现，提供有关稽查的信息对税收遵从产生了统计显著的影响，但其影响方式与 Allingham 和 Sandmo（1972）的模型预测不一致。
Abstract
The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). (JEL C93, D22, H25, H26, K34, L25, O14)