The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?
中文摘要
发展经济学的一个核心问题是，对行政权的制衡是否充分。本文提供了因果证据，说明通过取消总统在法官任命中的自由裁量权来强化对行政权的约束，如何促进法治。改革时法官的年龄结构与强制退休年龄法，为总统在法官任命中的自由裁量权终止提供了外生变异来源。总体而言，结果表明，总统任命法官会损害法治。司法机构与总统之间即便只有一层间隔，也会产生影响。（JEL D72, K40, O17）
Abstract
A central question in development economics is whether there are adequate checks and balances on the executive. This paper provides causal evidence of how increasing constraints on the executive—via removal of presidential discretion in judicial appointments—promotes the rule of law. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the termination of presidential discretion in judicial appointments. Overall, the results indicate that presidential appointment of judges deteriorates the rule of law. Even one degree of separation between the judiciary and the president matters. (JEL D72, K40, O17)