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层级与信息

Hierarchy and Information
Journal of Public Economics · 2023 · Daniel Rogger、Ravi Somani

中文摘要

公共官员用于决策的信息决定了公共资源的分配方式以及公共政策的有效性。本文提出了一种测量方法,用于评估一组基本官僚信念的准确性,并提供了实验证据,表明由层级结构中的高级成员发送的“证据简报”有可能提高这种准确性。公共官员的误差很大,超过50%的官员的误差至少达到客观基准数据的50%。政府层级中最低层级组织的官员,其误差比更高层级组织的官员小三分之一个标准差。提供证据简报使误差减少了四分之一个标准差,这意味着,相对于组织设计,证据可以在影响官僚信念准确性方面发挥实质性作用。

Abstract

The information public officials use to make decisions determines how public resources are distributed and the effectiveness of public policy. This paper develops a measurement approach for assessing the accuracy of a set of fundamental bureaucratic beliefs and provides experimental evidence on the possibility of ‘evidence briefings’ sent by senior members of the hierarchy improving that accuracy. The errors of public officials are large, with over 50 percent of officials making errors that are at least 50 percent of objective benchmark data. Officials at organizations at the lowest tier of government hierarchy make errors that are a third of a standard deviation smaller than those made by officials at higher-tier organizations. The provision of evidence briefings reduces errors by a quarter of a standard deviation, implying evidence can play a substantial role in influencing the accuracy of bureaucratic beliefs relative to organizational design.
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