中文摘要
在税收执法不力的情况下，逃税威胁可能制约政策制定者以最优方式设定税收政策的能力。本文研究更严格的税收执法是否会影响地方政府设定的税率表。我利用意大利的一项政策，该政策使各市镇通过更严格的税收执法打击所得税和财产税逃税的空间产生了差异。结合事件研究设计与市镇层面的法定税率面板数据，我发现，更严格的税收执法使税率设定更倾向于对中等收入和高收入群体实行更高的边际税率，而贫困群体则受益于更低的边际税率。在项目实施前不平等程度较高的地方，以及内在纳税遵从态度较弱的地方，增税幅度更大。由于税收收入增加，市镇政府雇用了更多工作人员，并增加了公共支出。这些结果提示，税收执法政策不仅能够提升税收能力，还能够增强推行再分配政策的能力。
Abstract
In contexts with weak enforcement, the threat of tax evasion may constrain policy makers’ power to set tax policies optimally. This paper studies whether stricter tax enforcement affects the tax schedule set by local governments. I take advantage of an Italian policy that generated cross-municipality variation in the scope for tackling income and property tax evasion through stricter tax enforcement. Combining an event-study design with municipality-level panel data on statutory tax rates, I show that stricter tax enforcement tips the balance in favor of higher marginal tax rates for middle and top incomes, while the poor benefit of a lower marginal tax rate. The tax hike is larger in places with higher pre-program inequality and where intrinsic tax compliance attitudes are weaker. As a result of higher tax revenue, municipalities hire more workers and raise public spending. These results suggest that tax enforcement policies have not only the power to foster tax capacity, but also to enhance the ability to pursue redistributive policies.