社会福利领取：来自法国的实验证据
Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · [{"name": "Laura Castell", "affiliation": ["National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies"]}, {"name": "Marc Gurgand", "affiliation": ["Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique", "École Normale Supérieure - PSL", "Paris School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Clément Imbert", "affiliation": ["Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris"]}, {"name": "Todor Tochev", "affiliation": ["Institut des Sciences Biologiques"]}]
中文摘要
我们报告了在法国针对求职者开展的两项全国性实验。我们首先表明，与社会服务机构会面以评估资格并协助申请社会福利，使新的福利领取增加了29%。相比之下，提供个性化福利资格信息的在线模拟器并未提高福利领取。边际处理效应表明，从会面中获益最多的个体最不可能参加。总体而言，在不排除信息摩擦的情况下，我们的结果表明，交易成本是申请福利或获取政府申请协助的主要障碍。（JEL D83, I38, J22, J65, R38）
Abstract
We report on two nationwide experiments with job seekers in France. We first show that a meeting with social services to assess eligibility and help with applications to social benefits increased new benefit take-up by 29 percent. By contrast, an online simulator that gave personalized information on benefit eligibility did not increase take-up. Marginal treatment effects show that individuals who benefit the most from the meetings are the least likely to attend. Overall, without ruling out information frictions, our results suggest that transaction costs represent the main obstacle to applying for benefits or accessing government’s assistance in applying. (JEL D83, I38, J22, J65, R38)