中文摘要
我们构建了一个福利分析框架，用于分析在可能存在行为偏误的情况下，旨在提高社会安全网项目参与率的干预措施。我们利用一项随机实地实验校准关键参数。该实验将30,000名尚未参加补充营养援助计划（SNAP）、但很可能符合参加资格的老年人随机分为三组：一组仅被告知其很可能符合资格；一组除获得这一信息外，还可获得申请协助；另一组为维持现状的对照组。在随后的九个月里，对照组中仅有6%的人参加了SNAP，而“仅提供信息”组和“信息加协助”组的这一比例分别为11%和18%。因任一干预措施而申请或参加SNAP的人，与对照组中已参加者的平均情况相比，净收入更高，患病程度也更轻。我们提供的证据与以下情形相一致：存在优化摩擦，且更需要帮助的人面临的摩擦更大。这提示，干预措施较差的瞄准表现降低了其福利收益。
Abstract
Abstract We develop a framework for welfare analysis of interventions designed to increase take-up of social safety net programs in the presence of potential behavioral biases. We calibrate the key parameters using a randomized field experiment in which 30,000 elderly individuals not enrolled in—but likely eligible for—the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) are either provided with information that they are likely eligible, provided with this information and offered assistance in applying, or are in a “status quo” control group. Only 6% of the control group enrolls in SNAP over the next nine months, compared to 11% of the Information Only group and 18% of the Information Plus Assistance group. The individuals who apply or enroll in response to either intervention have higher net income and are less sick than the average enrollee in the control group. We present evidence consistent with the existence of optimization frictions that are greater for needier individuals, which suggests that the poor targeting properties of the interventions reduce their welfare benefits.