American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · [{"name": "Adam Soliman", "affiliation": ["London School of Economics and Political Science"]}]
中文摘要
本文估计了对医生的打击整治对处方阿片类药物需求量、跨市场替代与跨产品替代的影响。利用行政处置在时间和地点上貌似外生的变异，我发现对单个医生实施打击整治会使县级阿片类药物配药量下降10%。这一下降在空间上持续存在，并随时间推移而扩大。此外，出现了显著的海洛因替代，但总体用药过量死亡率下降。这些结果凸显了政策制定者在采取定向打击时应权衡的一个关键取舍：新使用者流入的减少，必须与现有使用者转向更危险药物所带来的危害相权衡。（JEL I11, I12, I18, K42）
Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of doctor crackdowns on the quantity demanded of prescription opioids, across-market substitution, and across-product substitution. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the timing and location of administrative actions, I find cracking down on a single doctor decreases county-level opioid dispensing by 10 percent. This decline persists across space and grows over time. Additionally, significant heroin substitution occurs, yet overall overdose mortality decreases. These results highlight a critical tradeoff policymakers should consider with targeted crackdowns: Reductions in the flow of new users must be balanced against the harm that arises when existing users substitute to more dangerous drugs. (JEL I11, I12, I18, K42)