中文摘要
本文研究总体信贷冲击后耐用消费品市场的均衡动态。我们在一个耐用品消费的一般均衡模型中引入两个新特征。该模型中的异质性家庭面临个体特有的收入风险和借贷约束，新增特征为：（1）不可分割的耐用品在质量上存在垂直差异；（2）这些耐用品在二手市场上以市场出清价格交易，家庭内生地选择何时交易或报废其耐用品。该模型凸显了宏观经济冲击的一种新传导机制，并成功匹配了我们利用大衰退前后美国汽车市场数据记录的若干经验模式。借贷限额收紧后，受债务约束的家庭推迟报废和升级其低质量汽车的决定，从而压低中等质量汽车的价格。这一效应进而降低了富裕家庭用高质量汽车替换其中等质量汽车的激励，从而减少新车销量。我们进一步利用这一框架评估定向财政刺激政策，例如2009年的汽车补贴返还计划（Car Allowance Rebate System，即“旧车换现金”计划）。
Abstract
Abstract This article studies equilibrium dynamics in consumer durable goods markets after aggregate credit shocks. We introduce two novel features into a general-equilibrium model of durable consumption with heterogeneous households facing idiosyncratic income risk and borrowing constraints: (1) indivisible durable goods are vertically differentiated in their quality and (2) trade on secondary markets at market-clearing prices, with households endogenously choosing when to trade or scrap their durables. The model highlights a new transmission mechanism for macroeconomic shocks and successfully matches several empirical patterns that we document using data on U.S. car markets around the Great Recession. After a tightening of the borrowing limit, debt-constrained households postpone the decision to scrap and upgrade their low-quality cars, which depresses mid-quality car prices. In turn, this effect reduces wealthy households’ incentives to replace their mid-quality cars with high-quality ones, thereby decreasing new-car sales. We further use our framework to evaluate targeted fiscal stimulus policies such as the Car Allowance Rebate System in 2009 (“Cash for Clunkers”).