打击腐败会减少庇护主义吗
Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Gustavo J. Bobonis", "affiliation": ["University of Toronto"]}, {"name": "Paul Gertler", "affiliation": ["University of California System", "University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Marco Gonzalez-Navarro", "affiliation": ["University of California System", "University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Simeon Nichter", "affiliation": ["University of California System", "University of California San Diego"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 打击腐败能否减少庇护主义？为研究这一问题，我们聚焦于一项在世界各地被广泛采用的政策：反腐败审计。我们利用一项针对农村公民的新调查，考察巴西这一著名审计项目对庇护主义的影响。随机审计减少了政治人物提供的竞选施舍，降低了公民对私人品的需求，并减少了政治人物所满足的请求。我们考察审计可能减少庇护主义的机制，发现审计显著降低了公民提供庇护主义选票的意愿。
Abstract
Abstract Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? To investigate this question, we focus on a policy that has been widely used across the world: anti-corruption audits. We examine the impact of Brazil’s prominent audit programme on clientelism using a novel survey of rural citizens. Randomised audits reduce politicians’ provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens’ demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. We investigate mechanisms by which audits may reduce clientelism, and find that audits significantly reduce citizens’ willingness to supply clientelistic votes.